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ABSTRACT
Internet of Things (IoT) systems can often pose risk to users’ privacy
via disclosure of personal information to third parties. In this paper,
we argue that to assess privacy risks associated with IoT systems, an
automated solution is required due to the increasing pervasiveness
and complexity of deployed IoT systems. We propose requirements
for an automated privacy risk assessment service and outline our
future plans for realising such a solution.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privacy → Domain-specific security and pri-
vacy architectures; • Computing methodologies → Semantic
networks; • Computer systems organization→ Sensor networks;
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1 INTRODUCTION
The Internet of Things (IoT) refers to a collection of heterogeneous
devices and applications networked using the Internet and deployed
to observe and actuate various aspects of physical environments.
IoT systems can consist of sensors, actuators, gateways, cloud-
based message brokers, and various applications supporting data
management, analysis, and visualisation. Such systems can quickly
become large distributed ecosystems with complex data sharing
patterns. As a result it might be difficult for an individual tomaintain
their privacy by enacting “the power to selectively reveal oneself
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to the world” [4] when they may be unaware of the data being
collected about them in an IoT context and how it is being used.
The General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) dictates that the
use and collection of data about an individual for purposes other
than provision of direct services (e.g. research & development, busi-
ness modelling, etc.) is allowable only for non-personal information,
in order to maintain user privacy. As a result, any data collected
by an IoT system has to be evaluated for the presence of identi-
fiers1 and quasi-identifiers2. When such identifiers are collected,
anonymisation processes should be used, in which all identifiers
need to be removed and all quasi-identifiers need to go through
rigorous procedures to ensure user privacy [1].
In the IoT context, the risk of information privacy violation can
be high due to the way IoT systems operate. Personal data can be
“leaked”, for example, via device tampering, intercepting of mes-
sages transferred on unsecured networks, and gaining access to the
stored data [1]. Data can also be shared with third parties without
the knowledge of the user or without their consent. We argue that
due to the complexity and widespread use of IoT in everyday envi-
ronments, it is unfeasible to expect an individual to assess potential
privacy risks for every IoT system they encounter. To address this,
we propose a privacy risk assessment middleware service to support
user applications by informing them about privacy risks associated
with IoT systems.
In this paper, we outline the service input requirements (i.e. in-
formation about the IoT systems, user risk preferences, etc.) and
propose an approach for realising such a service. The remainder
of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 introduces a use
case scenario to highlight privacy risks faced by IoT systems; Sec-
tion 3 discusses different types of privacy risks and knowledge
requirements to support assessment of these; Section 4 outlines a
proposed architecture of an automated privacy assessment service;
and Section 5 concludes with a discussion of our future plans to
realise such a service.
1Information that can be directly related to an individual, such as name, email address
and contact number.
2Information parameters that have no meaning on their own but if observed in corre-
lation with other quasi identifiers can reveal the actual identity of an individual; for
example age, location and ethnicity.
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2 USE CASE: IOT KETTLE
Figure 1: An illustration of main components of the smart
kettle IoT infrastructure.
To illustrate risks associated with sharing of personal informa-
tion in IoT systems, let us consider the case of smart kettles as
an example. A common household appliance (the kettle) has been
extended with “smart” capabilities. Along with the “original” ability
(boiling water), “smart” kettles are connected to the Internet allow-
ing the operation of the kettle to be controlled via a smart phone
app, the ability to set the temperature water is heated to based on
a specific requirement (e.g. to prepare baby formula), and real-time
monitoring of the water temperature. In order to provide these
features, smart kettles are typically supported by a cloud-based IoT
architecture [5] which handles the exchange of data between the
kettle, cloud services operated by the manufacturer (or a company
acting on their behalf), and the app (users). Figure 1 illustrates
such an architecture. The user interacts with the kettle via a smart
phone app which is backed by an API provided by the Smart Kettle
Company - i.e. a company responsible for delivery of smart ket-
tle features. The Smart Kettle Company runs a cloud service that
enables collection of data from the kettle (e.g. current water temper-
ature) and control of the device (e.g. starting the boiling cycle). It
also provides the user’s mobile app which requires users to provide
personal information when registering the kettle with the app. Both
this personal data (name, email, registered kettle id) and further
data (location, water temperatures, time of starting/stopping the
boiling cycle) are then stored on company’s servers. In such a sce-
nario, the more entities involved in the information flow and/or
storage, the higher the risk to a kettle owner’s privacy. An adver-
sary can, for example, violate their privacy either by tampering
with the kettle physically or by launching an eavesdropping attack
to gain personal information such as device id or location and use
this to profile an individual. Data can also be shared without the
owner’s knowledge with, for example, a Marketing Company for
targeted marketing. A simple device such as a kettle can then reveal
vital information such as the work pattern of individuals in the
household, or can highlight the presence of an infant based on the
“baby bottle” feature usage pattern.
3 AUTOMATED ASSESSMENT OF PRIVACY
RISKS
The smart kettle scenario introduced in the previous section is a typ-
ical example of W3CWeb of Things IoT architecture for cloud ready
devices [5]. It highlights a number of potential privacy risks due to
the transfer and storage of personal data (name, email, associated
kettles) and quasi-personal data (kettle id with event timestamps).
We will now discuss the different types of privacy risks and the
information about IoT systems that is required in order to assess
them.
3.1 Privacy Risks in IoT Systems
The privacy risks associated with the use of an IoT device can
emerge from three parts of the device’s setup: the device itself, the
communication channel, and the data storage location [1].
Most IoT devices such as the smart kettle are small in size and are
physically accessible to the device user. These devices are designed
and developed by various vendors thus posing a large variety of
privacy risks. The small size and accessible nature increases the
possibility of device tampering by ill intent of the user (e.g. to tam-
per with the device data) or theft by an external adversary. The
large number of vendors combined with the ease of purchasing a
device increases the chances of coming across a device that does
not comply with the latest privacy policies such as the GDPR or
relies on outdated privacy definitions resulting in privacy violations
even through legally shared data. In such context, a privacy defi-
nition refers to the combination of encryption and anonymisation
approaches that are used to ensure user privacy. The lack of an
updated privacy definition results in a high probability of a privacy
violation through the communication channel. These IoT devices
relay information to the backhaul network via the Internet thus
relying on multiple intermediate nodes. The large number of inter-
mediate nodes makes it possible for an adversary to overhear the
communication via eavesdropping thus obtaining personal infor-
mation without a user’s consent. IoT device manufacturers manage
their devices with the help of data processing and storage facilities.
They gather information from all devices, process it to ensure pri-
vacy and then make that information available to the device user.
Manufacturers can either host information on their own servers
or can hire third party companies for such a purpose. In either
case, it is crucial to monitor who has access to the stored dataset.
Conventionally, an anonymised version of this stored dataset is
shared with third party companies for the purpose of analysis and
research. The amount of risk that this shared data poses depends
heavily on the privacy definition that is in place. An anonymised
version of a dataset can be correlated to data obtained from sec-
ondary sources if the data is not carefully anonymised. Similarly,
a third party company hosting such a dataset can exploit user’s
privacy by illegally sharing this data with data analysts thus posing
a high privacy risk [1]. A detailed division and explanation of these
potential risks can be found in [1].
A user can face a risk of privacy violation due to any of the afore-
mentioned reasons. Therefore, in order to evaluate the potential
privacy risk, one needs to take into account all possible venues that
an adversary can exploit. Building on our previous work [1], we
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propose to exploit this approach also in the design of the automated
risk assessment service which is discussed further in Section 4.
3.2 Enabling Transparency of IoT Systems to
Support Risk Assessment
The risks discussed above can originate from several locations, such
as the kettle, the app, transfer of data between the app and kettle,
kettle and cloud services, and sharing of data stored by the com-
pany. For computational processes to be capable of automatically
identifying such privacy risks, it is necessary to develop robust
auditing mechanisms, which pose a challenge in a distributed IoT
environment [9]. We propose to address this challenge by recording
structured, machine readable descriptions of the various IoT con-
cepts involved in the deployment/architecture. These descriptions
would include information describing IoT devices, how data is being
acquired and used, agents involved in data processing, and so on.
Semantic technologies such as ontologies and linked data3 provide
a method to define machine processable model of domain concepts,
such as IoT devices, and their inter-relationships, which can be
shared and reused across different IoT deployments and reasoning
applications, such as the privacy assessment service proposed by
this paper.
Ontologies are expected to play an important part of future IoT
systems [10]. One such ontology is the Semantic Sensor Network
Ontology (SSNO), a W3C recommendation [6] which provides for-
malisms to describe sensors and related concepts in domains such
as the Internet of Things. SSNO can be used to describe systems,
such as the smart kettle, in terms of the sensor, actuators, samplers,
and other types of system that it is composed of. The capabilities,
survival, and operating ranges of each system can also be specified.
For example, the smart kettle system includes a temperature sensor
which has a survival and operating range of at least between 0 and
100 ◦C, can measure temperature with an accuracy of +/- 1 ◦C with
a frequency of at least 1 second between observations. SSNO can
also describe the observations made by the temperature sensor, in
terms of their type (observations of temperature), the feature of
interest (i.e. the thing being observed - the water in the kettle), the
property of that that is being observed (i.e. temperature), and the
observation result value (e.g. 99), unit of measurement (◦C), and
time that the observation was made.
SSNO can also describe the deployment of the smart kettle, in
terms of where it has been installed. Further details of the de-
ployment can be described using the SSN System Deployment
Provenance Ontology (SDPO) [2]. SDPO extends the PROV W3C
recommendation [8] for documenting provenance to support de-
scribing any of the activities (e.g. installation, system setup, device
purchase, registration, and maintenance operations) that have been
performed before (or during) the deployment, the agents (people,
software agents, or organisations) associated with those activities
(and their role - for example, a company selling the device, or the
homeowner/user setting it up) and other entities (things) used (e.g.
the app used to register the kettle, the worktop on which it is in-
stalled). SDPO also allows the expected behaviour of the device
to be described in terms of the process that it will enact during a
3https://www.w3.org/standards/semanticweb/data
deployment using extensions of the P-Plan ontology [3]. For ex-
ample, the kettle has a plan to heat the water in response to a
user’s instruction, until the temperature sensor observes a certain
temperature has been reached.
P-PLAN and PROV have been also extended in another of our
recently developed ontologies MQTT-PLAN [7] designed to en-
able recording provenance generated by MQTT4 message brokers.
The ontology can be used to document the intended and actual
behaviour of message brokers. This could then support audit of mes-
sage distribution (e.g. to which agents was a message forwarded). In
addition, such provenance could be used to discover issues relating
to malfunctions, misconfigurations or the limited capabilities of
message brokers (e.g. not detecting abnormal behaviour such as
repeated failed authentication attempts). For example, such records
can reveal a malicious agent repetitively attempting to request for-
warding of messages under topics (e.g. the kettle usage) without
appropriate authorisation.
3.3 Knowledge Gaps for Privacy Risk
Assessment
As we have outlined in the previous section, several aspects of IoT
systems can be described using machine processable semantic anno-
tations. However, in order for a middleware service to automatically
reason about and identify potential privacy risks, we argue that the
following must also be modelled:
• Conceptualisation of the planned agency within IoT systems - i.e.
representations of agents in relation to their intended responsi-
bilities within a plan.
• Concepts enabling classification and tracking of various types
of personal and quasi-personal data within an IoT system (both
planned and actual).
• Concepts enabling classification and tracking of anonymisation
techniques applied to data at any point in the IoT system (both
planned and actual).
• Concepts describing cloud-based components that deal with pro-
cesses such as storing and analysing of data.
• Concepts for linking descriptions of intended policies (e.g., pri-
vacy, security, user policies) and constraints applied to data and
processes in IoT systems and provenance of compliance with
these.
• Concepts representing results of the privacy risk assessment and
their relationships to other concepts used to evaluate such risk.
4 PRIVACY RISK ASSESSMENT SERVICE
Cloud 
Services
Gateway
Sensors & 
Actuators 
Deployment
Risk 
Assessment 
Service
App
Figure 2: An illustration of the position of the privacy risk
assessment service in the IoT architecture.
4MQTT is a publish/subscribe messaging transport protocol for a client-server commu-
nication. The protocol specifies a set of control packets that govern the communication
between the client and the message broker residing on a server.
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The computational power required to perform privacy risk as-
sessments typically cannot be delivered by edge devices such as
sensors and actuators. Therefore, such service would exist as part of
a gateway or as a cloud-based component in an IoT system (Figure
2). Figure 3 illustrates a proposed architecture of such a service.
Semantic Annotation Service
Triple Store
IoT 
Devices
IoT Management 
Platforms
Product 
Technical Sheets
Manual 
Input
Data Collection 
Plugins
Privacy Risk Assessment Service
Query Api
Application  Api
Query Manager
Risk Assessment Model
Message 
Brokers
Figure 3: An illustration of a high level architecture of the
proposed risk assessment service.
The semantic annotations stored in the triple store include descrip-
tions of devices, data flow structures, types of data exchange, and
provenance describing the planned and the actual behaviour of an
IoT system are obtained from a range of heterogeneous sources.
These might include IoT management platforms (e.g. NodeRed5,
Kura6, OM2M7), message brokers (e.g. Mosquitto8), individual IoT
devices (e.g. sensors), hardware specification sheets / data sheets
(e.g. Texas Instruments website9), and manual inputs (e.g. from
installation engineers, users, etc.). The semantic annotations are
modelled using extensions of SSNO to describe the IoT devices and
domain specific extensions of PROV and P-PLAN (e.g. SDPO and
MQTT-PLAN) to document systems’ provenance as discussed in
section 3.2. Annotations are stored in a semantic data store (triple
store) and can be queried via an API endpoint using SPARQL query
syntax10. Results of such queries represent various information
about an IoT system and serve as input parameters of a privacy risk
assessment service.
The privacy assessment service evaluates the input information
based on a risk model which considers three parts of the network
that can pose a risk: the device, the communication channel and
the data storage location. To realise this component, we propose to
implement an attack tree model introduced in our previous work
[1] with any potential modifications to accommodate new input
parameters resulting from rich semantic descriptions of IoT sys-
tems. The attack tree model makes use of the logical AND/OR gate
structure to form a hierarchical structure, where the parent node,
referred to as the goal of the tree, is the risk of privacy violation, the
intermediate nodes are referred to as sub-goals and the leaf nodes
are individual privacy risk attacks such as risk of device tampering.
Each independent path in the risk tree becomes a separate scenario
and each of these scenarios has a different probability of occurrence.
The probability of occurrence of a scenario depends on factors such
as the attack impact, the cost of an attack, the technical difficulty
5https://nodered.org
6https://www.eclipse.org/kura/
7http://www.eclipse.org/om2m/
8https://mosquitto.org
9http://www.ti.com/
10https://www.w3.org/TR/sparql11-overview/
and the probability of being discovered. For instance, the proba-
bility of having a device tampering attack is greater for a smart
kettle than a smart meter as the cost of an attack and the technical
difficulty of tampering with a smart meter is greater than that of a
kettle. This means that in order to assess the privacy risk for an IoT
device, one needs to consider all device parameters, the communi-
cation framework and the data storage protocols. This would help
analyse the probability of occurrence of each sub-goal and the leaf
node in an attack tree model thus resulting in better approximation
of the risk associated to that device. The results of the assessment
can be made available via application API to enable development
of interfaces informing users about privacy risks. Such results can
then be presented in combination with the semantic annotations
used by the service, for example, to inform about the coverage and
type of information about an IoT system the service had access to
when assessing risk.
5 FUTUREWORK
As part of our future work we aim to extend the ontologies dis-
cussed in Section 3.2 according to the requirements outlined in
Section 3.3. In addition, we plan to develop a prototype realisation
of the discussed service and perform evaluation using real world
IoT deployments. For this we will ustilise our community testbed
environment established as part of the TrustLens11 project that is
investigating issues related to transparency and accountability of
IoT systems as well as empowerment of the users via providing
control over these systems.
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